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SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
By ELI M. SPARK*
Comparatively little litigation reached the Georgia appellate courts in
this field, especially when one considers the extensive and continual use of
the various security devices in real estate, business and legal activities. The
cases will be classified and treated under descriptive headings.
REAL PROPERTY SECURITY

Reardon v. Bland' was an action to cancel a security deed, and the sale
of the property and deed executed under the power of sale therein, on the
ground that the notes and security deed had been fraudulently procured
for an excessive amount. An injunction was also sought to prohibit interference with the debtor's possession of the property, and to restrain the creditor from selling, encumbering or otherwise disposing of the property. The
petition did not allege, however, that the debtor had paid or offered to
pay any part of the actual indebtedness which the petition itself showed he
owed the creditor, and the petition contained no offer to do so. The Supreme Court ruled that the petition therefore failed to state a cause of
action.'
In Butler v. Hazelrigs3 the petitioner sued to establish her equity in real
estate. She alleged that her husband had sold her a one-half interest in the
property and that she had paid him $700 for it, but that he refused to
execute a deed thereof to her. The husband then gave another person a
security deed to the property. In an earlier appearance of the case in the
Supreme Court' a general demurrer, to the petition had been overruled,
since the petitioner alleged that the defendant had taken the security deed
without consideration and with knowledge of the plaintiff's equity; but on
the subsequent trial there had been no proof of such alleged lack of consideration or knowledge of the plaintiff's equity. Plaintiff having been
nonsuited below, the Supreme Court accordingly affirmed. Also in Schnuck
v. West Lumber Co.5 it was sought to declare null and void a sale of real
property under a power of sale contained in a security deed because
$52.56 of a $IO,OOO building loan, for which the security deed had been
given, had not been paid to the borrower. Such allegation was held insufficient to show that the debt was not in default at the time of the foreclosure,
where it was not alleged that the borrower had attempted to procure the
balance and had been refused, or that the application of such balance to
the payment of the debt would have prevented a default.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

*Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University; A.B., 1926;
College of City of New York; LL.B., 1929, Fordham University; Member New York
Bar and Georgia Bar Association.
206 Ga. 633, 58 S.E.2d 377 (1950).
Citing GA. CODE § 20-906 and 37-104 (1933).
205 Ga. 425, 54 S.E.2d 266 (1949).
Hazelrigs v. Butler, 204 Ga. 98, 48 S.E.2d 727 (1948).
205 Ga. 827, 55 S.E.2d 213 (1949).
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In Williams v. Rowe Banking Co.' a loan had been made, and a note
and security deed with power of sale were executed and delivered to the
lender. The land was later sold to another, subject to the security deed, and
the purchaser assumed the payment of the balance of the debt. The purchaser gave his own note for such balance to the security grantee, to replace the borrower's original note. After default, the purchaser sought to
enjoin a sale of the land under the power and to cancel the security deed,
contending that there had been a novation which extinguished the security
deed and the power of sale. The Supreme Court held that the original note
and security deed constituted a single contract; that the substitution of another payor in the note while the parties, terms and conditions of the deed
remained the same, was a change in only one of the terms of the original
contract; and that hence there had not been such an extinguishment thereof
as to create a novation and destroy the power of sale. This result is, of
course, proper, as the purchaser's contention was a mere flimsy technicality
which did not accord with the understanding and intent of the parties to
such a transaction.
In Cordell v. Cordeil7 the Supreme Court held that an answer alleging
that a life tenant had paid from his own funds purchase money notes secured by a security deed to realty, and obtained an assignment of the notes
and security deed, and that he had not agreed to make such payments as
part of the consideration for the conveyance of the life estate to him,
was sufficient to show that the life tenant was entitled to be subrogated to
the rights of his assignors at the time of assignment, and to assert a lien
against the realty for the payments which he had made. Defendant
was not a mere volunteer, said the court, for he had a life estate in the property and was properly concerned with preserving that interest.
Westbrook v. Beusse 8 was a tort action by the grantee against a timber
purchaser and the grantor in a deed to secure debt, because timber had been
cut from the realty and sold by the security grantor in violation of an express provision of the security deed. Upon default, the grantee had accepted a warranty deed to the realty in satisfaction of the secured debt, but
did not inspect the realty, and hence had not known that the timber had
been cut. No fraud of the grantor prevented the grantee from so inspecting and no confidential relationship existed, according to the Court of
Appeals, so that the statutes dealing with fraud by acts or silence, suppression of truth and concealment were not applicable. Since the courts will
generally not give relief to a purchaser of realty who could have discovered
by inspection the falsity of a vendor's representation, except where there
is a confidential relationship between vendor and purchaser, or the purchaser is prevented by artifice or fraud from making an inspection, the grantee
here was held not entitled to recover. A general demurrer to the petition
having been sustained below, the whole Court of Appeals affirmed, four to
two. One of the majority judges, who concurred specially, pointed out that
Code Section 105-1412, which gives the holder of a security deed a right

to sue for conversion of timber from the land held as security and to recover up to the unpaid balance of the debt, could not be applied here be6. 205 Ga. 770, 55 S.E.2d 123 (1949).
7. 206 Ga. 214, 56 S.E.2d 251 (1949).
8. 79 Ga. App. 654, 54 S.E.2d 693 (1949).
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cause the debt for which the security deed was given had been extinguished.
The two dissenting judges, however, felt that the express contractual obligation not to cut timber, which was contained in the security deed, made the
grantor in effect a trustee, and he had a duty to disclose the cutting, so
that there was no negligence on the plaintiff's part on failing to inspect.
The policy of the rule, said the dissenting judges, is to prevent frauds, not
to encourage them, as would be done under the result reached by the majority.
PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY

In Scoggins v. General Finance & Thrift Corp.' a contract for a conditional sale of an automobile was properly recorded in the county of the
buyer's residence within 30 days of the date of its execution. The buyer
made a loan on the car from a bank, however, and executed to it a bill of
sale to secure debt, which was recorded before the conditional sale contract. In a trover action it was held that the registration of the conditional
bill of sale gave constructive notice of its existence from the date of its execution under Code Section 67-1403, while constructive notice of the security bill of sale was given only from the date of its filing for record under Code Sections 67-1304 and 29-401. Thus the plaintiff's later recorded
conditional bill of sale, by virtue of this retroactive effect, prevailed over
the earlier recorded security bill of sale. Defendant in the action had
bought the car from the original conditional vendee, knowing only of the
claim of the bank, and had paid the bank the amount due it. As the conditional vendor's rights were superior to the bank's, however, the Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff was not required to tender to the defendant
the amount he had paid the bank as a condition precedent to maintaining
the action.
Colonial Finance Co. v. Anthony' ° involved the requirement of Code
Section 67-108 that any mortgage on personal property located outside
the state must be recorded within six months after said property is brought
into the state, otherwise the mortgage lien is divested as to 'bona fide purchasers for value without notice. There had been such a failure to record
here an Ohio chattel mortgage upon an Ohio automobile which had been
brought into Georgia. The car had been sold in Georgia to a bona fide
purchaser who had no notice of the mortgage; it was therefore held that
the mortgagee could not foreclose the mortgage as against such purchaser.
The purpose of this statute is to protect innocent purchasers without notice from claims or liens which it might be impossible to discover in the
course of a prudent investigation, and to provide for stable regulations
under which title to personalty may be legally transferred. As the court
put it:
" . . . Most of our States now have recording statutes designed to protect
their citizens against unknown claims and liens which it would be impossible
for them to discover. Unless some such protection were afforded, in the present
state of mobility of such articles as motor vehicles, it would be a practical impossibility to carry on the transfer and sale of goods with any degree of
security. Therefore, in the absence of other circumstance, such as fraud or
9. 80 Ga. App. 847, 57 S.E.2d 686 (1950).
10. 79 Ga. App. 763, 54 S.E.2d 326 (1949).

1950l

SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

estoppel, the mortgagor who wishes to protect his lien must follow the procedure outlined. It is true, in some cases, he may have difficulty in following
the property within the time allowed by law, but it is both easier and more
equitable for him to do this, after voluntarily parting with its possession,
than for a buyer of personal property to'be required to locate liens and claims
the only record of which exists in some unknown State.""
2 was a case not without

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Monday'
its amusing aspects, particularly to the veteran who never attained the rank
of, or lost his aversion to, the exalted personage known as a sergeant. A
private first-class in 1948 bought a used 1946 Oldsmobile; a balance of
$1,400 over the down payment was covered by a conditional sale agree-

ment. Twenty-five days later he sold the car to a sergeant, with the extraordinary name of Fine Monday, representing the title as free and clear.
The duped sergeant acted in good faith and did not know of any claim or
lien against the car; he gave the seller in exchange a Buick worth $1,25o
Plus $1,038 in cash, and took a bill of sale. Upon default under the conditional sale agreement, the conditional vendor foreclosed. The sergeant
naturally defended what ought to have been his property. It does not
appear from the report that the sergeant had before purchasing searched
the records of Dougherty County, in which the air base was located at
which both he and the private were stationed, to ascertain whether any
lien appeared of record against the car; nevertheless his attorneys asserted, in support of his claim to the car, that the failure to record in
Dougherty County invalidated the plaintiff's conditional sale agreement,
even though it had been recorded in Grady County where the private had
his actual legal residence, and where his family lived. The car had been
kept by the private, and thus located, from purchase to resale, at his barracks in Dougherty County, except when he visited his family in Grady
County. Since the registration and record of conditional bills of sale are
controlled by the laws relating to the registration of chattel mortgages 3
and a provision of Code Section 67-1o8 requires that "All chattel mortgages of stocks of goods, wares and merchandise, or other personal property" shall be recorded not only in the county of the mortgagor's residence
but, if said property is located at the time of execution of said mortgage
in another county, in that county also, it was argued on Sergeant Monday's
behalf that this provision applied, and recording in Dougherty County also was required. The trial court was persuaded to render judgment in the
sergeant's favor. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that
this was obviously a misconstruction, and that the doctrine of ejusdem generis made the provision applicable only to situations such as that of. a
merchant or other tradesman living in one county and conducting a store
or business in another. Since keeping and storing automobiles in Dougherty
County was not the private's business, the only requirement in Code Section
67-108 which did apply in order to create constructive notice was that calling for recording in the county of the mortgagor's residence. The court
pointed out that the base where a person in military service is stationed is
not necessarily his "residence," since residence is controlled by a person's
11.
12.
13.

79 Ga. App. at 765, 54 S.E.2d at 328 (1949).
79 Ga. App. 609, 54 S.E.2d 479 (1949).
GA. CODE ANN. § 67-1403 (Supp. 1947).
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intention. Result: "Fine Monday" reverts to the more familiar "Blue Monday."
By Act No. 527" the statutory provisions as to filing an affidavit to extend the effectiveness of recorded personal property lien instruments after
seven years," formerly inapplicable only as to property of railroad corporations and their receivers and trustees alone, were made not applicable also
to property owned by, or sold or leased to, or agreed to be sold or leased to,
street railroad corporations, electric or gas corporations, or other public
utility corporations, or their receivers, trustees or other legal officers in
possession of or operating them.
MECHANICS' AND MATERIALiIEN'S LIENS

Marshallv. Peacock6 ruled that in a proceeding to foreclose a materialman's lien, the plaintiff must show that the amount for which he asserts
a lien comes, in whole or in part, within the contract price agreed upon
by the contractor and the owner of the property improved ;" hence a petition
which failed to show that there was a contract with the owner of the property, or that the owner adopted the contract as one made for him, or that
the lien covered in whole or in part the contract price of the materials furnished by the petitioner, did not state a cause of action to foreclose such a
lien. As the court stated:
"In Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Shiver, siipra, 1125 Ga. 221, 53 S.E.
6111 in a proceeding to foreclcse a materialman's lien, it was held in part: 'It
seems to be the purpose of the statute to charge the owner of real estate with
a lien for material furnished only when there was a specific contract for the
improvements made, either made by the owner or assented to by him . . . The
statute provides that 'in no event shall the aggregate amount of liens claimed
exceed the contract price of the improvements made.' There could be no limit
upon the true owner's liability for material furnished, unless the material was
furnished under some contract to which he was a party expressly or by implication . . . There need b2 no contract between the materialmen and the true
owner, but there must be a contract for material with a person who has contracted with the true owner for the erection of the improvements. A contract
is necessary to fix the liability of the owner, and establish a privity between
him and the materialman. A stranger may not order work done upon real
estate and thus charge the true owner. Neither may a tenant, unless there is
some relation existing between him and his landlord other than that of lessor
and lessee.' See Code, § 67-2001 (2) ; Reppard v. Morrisov, 120 .- a. 28 (47 S.E.
554); Picklesimer v. Smith, 164 Ga. 600, 607 (139 S.E. 72); Georghi State
Savings Association v. Wilson, 189 Ga. 21 (5 S.E.2d, 14) ; Rutlawd Contracting
Co. v. Sallie E. Gay Estate, 193 Ga. 469 (18 S.E.2d, 835).
"The plaintiff does not allege that he had a contract with Jenkins or any
other person to furnish materials, nor does he allege that the lien which he
seeks to have foreclosed covers, in whole or in part, the contract price of the
materials. In the absence of allegations of a contract, and the amount to be
paid under the contract for materials, the petition failed to state a cause of
action for any affirmatice relief ....
18

In Chambers v. Williams Bros. Lumber Co. 9 it was ruled that in an action to recover for lumber furnished to contractors, and to have a special
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Ga. Laws 1950, p. 33.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2504 - 67-2508 (Supp. 1947).
205 Ga. 891, 55 S.E.2d 354 (1949).
Citing GA. CODE ANN. § 67-2001(2) (Supp. 1947).
205 Ga. at 893, 57 S.E.2d at 355-6 (1950).
80 Ga. App. 38, 55 S.E.2d 244 (1949).
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lien established against the owner of the house constructed by the contractors, the plaintiff must show, to recover against the owner, that specific material of the value alleged was delivered on the property of the owner
and was used by the contractors in the construction of the house; that within three months from the date the materials were so furnished the
plaintiff recorded a claim of lien; and that the plaintiff commenced an action
for recovery of the claim within twelve months from the time it became
due. While the plaintiff was held to have established its claim against the
contractors in this case, it failed in the claim against the owner, since the
court found that it did not appear sufficiently from the evidence that the
specific material of the value alleged was delivered on the owner's premises
or used in his house.
Cowart v. Reeves"- involved Code Section 67-2002 (3), which provides
that if a contractor procuring materials for improving real estate shall
"abscond" or "remove" from the state within twelve months after the
debt becomes due, so that personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained of him
in a suit for the materials, the person furnishing the materials shall be
relieved of the need to obtain judgment against the contractor as a prerequisite to enforcing a lien directly against the property improved. Even
though the statute must be strictly construed, it was held to apply to resident and non-resident contractors, and to one who has no permanent residence, and to mean removal from the place where the work was done to
a place beyond the court's jurisdiction. A materialman's action to establish
a lien on the property could therefore be maintained if brought within
twelve months, said the court, even though the contractors, who could not
be served within the twelve months, had been non-residents when they did
the work. The fact that one such non-resident contractor subsequently returned to the jurisdiction, and was served with process after the twelve
months had expired, was immaterial. The court also held that interest on
the amount of such materialman's lien does not run until after rendition'
of the judgment, as the amount thereof becomes liquidated only after
such judgment fixing it. The owner of the property had in this case transferred legal title under a security deed prior to making the improvements,
and the grantee in such security deed had not been joined as a party to the
action. The court held that such grantee was not a necessary party, but
that his interest would not be affected; it accordingly directed that the
judgment be amended so as to be specifically subject to the security grantee's interest.
SURETY BONDS
In Southeastern Construction Co. for use of Gill Equipment Co. v. Glens
Falls Indemnity Co."' a performance bond had been furnished by a subcontractor to a contractor on construction work. A materialman who furnished material to the subcontractor was held entitled to maintain an action
on the bond. In order to determine its meaning, the bond was construed
together with (i) the contract between the principal contractor and sub20. 80 Ga. App. 161, 55 S.E.2d 911 (1949).
21. 81 Ga. App. 764, 59 S.E.2d 747 (1950).
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contractor and (2) the contract between the owner and the principal contractor. The first called it "a payment and a completion bond"; the provisions of the second, incorporated by reference into the first, were held to
make it a contract to furnish and pay for labor and materials. The Court
of Appeals stated:
" . . . A performance bond guaranteeing performance of a contract agreeing to furnish and pay for labor and materials as effectively runs to laborers
and materialmen as does a bond indemnifying a named obligee against loss and
also guaranteeing that the contractor would pay laborers and materialmen,
especially if it is a bond complying with a contract to furnish a payment bond.
which could have but one purpose and that is to guarantee the payment of
laborers. and materialmen. We can see no distinction between an agreement
to furnish and pay for labor and materials and one agreeing to pay laborers
and materialmen for the labor and material they furnish. 22Payment could only be
made to the ones who furnished the labor and materials.

In a kindred case, Southeastern Construction Co. for use of Beckman
v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co.,23 there was involved a claim by another
materialman to recover a penalty and attorney's fees under Code Section
56-7o6 because of the surety company's refusal to pay under the same
bond. The Court of Appeals held, however, that the surety company's
liability to a materialman thereunder was in such high degree of doubt
as to constitute reasonable cause for refusing payment, and to negative
any imputation of bad faith on its part, so that such penalty and attorney's fees could not be recovered.
Gunby for use of Bogle v. Roberts" ruled that a petition stated a cause
of action against a surety on a guardian's bond under Code Section 49-237
when it alleged that the guardian received and wasted his ward's money,
failed to collect notes and enforce payment of a judgment in possession of
the ward, was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and was a debtor liable
to attachment, even though it contained no allegation that the guardian
had been removed, or that his letters had been revoked.
22. Id. at 768, 59 S.E.2d at 750 (1950).
23. 81 Ga. App. 770, 59 S.E.2d 751 (1950).
24. 79 Ga. App. 645, 54 S.E.2d 448 (1949).

